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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS: THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AFTER ITOBA
JOSEPH P. GARLAND
BRIAN P. MuRRAY*
Since its enactment in 1934, the legislative acorn that is the Securi-
ties Exchange Act' has, in then-Justice Rehnquist's famous phrase,
sprouted the judicial oak of private rights of action for section 10(b). 2 By
necessity, given the myriad possibilities, the legislative acorn similarly
offers little guidance on the issue of how it applies to events and people
outside the United States. "We freely acknowledge," the Second Cir-
cuit's Judge Henry Friendly observed, "that if we were asked to point to
language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled
these conclusions, we would be unable to respond. The Congresses that
passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation [the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] in the midst of the de-
pression could hardly have been expected to foresee the development of
off-shore frauds thirty years later. . . . Our conclusions rest on case law
* Mr. Garland, B.A., Manhattanville College (1978); J.D., Columbia University
(1981), is a sole practitioner in Mount Vernon, New York. Mr. Murray, University of No-
tre Dame (1983); M.A., University of Notre Dame (1986); J.D., St. John's University
(1990), is an associate at Rabin & Peckel LLP. They specialize in securities and antitrust
litigation.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk.
2. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Section
10(b) provides:
Manipulative and deceptive devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Although some courts and practitioners equate SEC Rule lOb-5 with
section 10(b) and refer to actions under rule lOb-5, the two are not equivalent. See, e.g.,
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, - U.S.
__ 116 S. Ct. 702 (1996). The former was promulgated pursuant to authority granted in
the former and therefore the rule's reach cannot exceed the statute's. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (to the extent that rule lob-5 allowed finding of li-
ability without scienter, it exceeded the statutory authorization and was invalid). The bet-
ter practice is to refer to actions as being brought under section 10(b).
(235)
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and commentary concerning the application of the securities laws and
other statutes to situations with foreign elements and on our best judg-
ment as to what Congress would have wished if these problems had oc-
curred to it."' 3 Put another way in an earlier Friendly opinion, "we must
ask ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about the point," it
would have allowed the assertion of jurisdiction over particular events
with foreign aspects.4
The purpose of this article is to shed light on how the judicial oak
has grown on the issue of the extraterritorial application of implied pri-
vate rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act. Our conclusion
is that the shade created by the cases that address the subject is variable
and does not offer clear lines, at least at the penumbra, of what is and
what is not covered.
I SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS CONCERNING EXTRATERRiTORIAL
APPLICATION
Although the federal securities laws are silent as to their extraterrito-
rial application,5 there is a considerable body of law to help determine
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in a particular case.6
3. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975). This approach to interpreting the Exchange Act was most recently en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate of Den-
ver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994). The Court wrote, "When the text of §10(b) does not
resolve a particular issue, we attempt to infer how the 1934 Congress would have ad-
dressed the issue had the lob-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934
Act."
4. Leasco Data Processing v. Kernan, 468 F.2d 1326, 1337 (2d Cir. 1972).
5. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1005
(1991). See also MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir.
1990).
6. At the outset we wish to emphasize one point. We, and the courts generally, refer
to "subject matter jurisdiction" in the context of the Exchange Act as raising the issue of
whether Congress elected to extend the protection of that Act to particular types of trans-
actions or parties. It is important to distinguish between the extent to which a country
may assert its judicial authority as discussed in both the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAw § 18 (1995) and applied by the courts under the principles of due
process, see Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1333-34 (referring to U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer.,
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd Cir. 1954) - and the extent to which it elects to - referred to
as "competence" in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON'UCTS OF LAW § 97 (1971). The
latter phrase has not garnered widespread use, and for purposes of this article we refer to
competence as "subject matter jurisdiction" and we refer to the Restatement's "jurisdic-
tion" as "constitutional jurisdiction." The easiest way to appreciate the distinction is the
situation where a defendant has engaged in some conduct in the United States in connec-
tion with an offering. The Second Circuit, in Bersch, held that in that case an American
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A coherent theme appears in these cases, and one can see a general
test that will be applied to determine whether particular transactions or
conduct will be subject to claims under the Exchange Act. In a trilogy of
cases, the Second Circuit established the "conduct" test and the "ef-
fects" test to determine subject matter jurisdiction.7 The two standards
are usually applied separately.8 Recently, however, in Itoba Ltd. v. Lep
Group PLC, the Second Circuit announced an "admixture" of the two,
using them concurrently.9 This new formulation has consequences that go
far beyond a seemingly innocuous combination of two old tests.10
II. THE LEGISLATIVE ACORN
Section 29 of the Exchange Act sets forth its jurisdiction:
The district courts of the United States and the United States
courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereun-
der. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district
wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred.
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this
title or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any viola-
court could constitutionally exercise its power and hear a section 10(b) claim (i.e. consti-
tutional jurisdiction), 519 F.2d at 985, but that Congress has elected only to allow such
claims if made by an American citizen, even if residing abroad (i.e. competence or sub-
ject matter jurisdiction). Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985, 987, and 992 (emphasis added). See
also infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Those courts that have considered the
scope of the Exchange Act have held that Congress has not extended subject matter com-
petence to the extent permitted by foreign relations law. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334. In
sum, we use the more common term "jurisdiction" as a shorthand for subject matter ju-
risdiction, i.e. the extent that Congress has elected to exercise its authority.
7. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equipment v. Kernen, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); ITT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1995).
8. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1005 (1991).
9. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2nd Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 702 (1996).
10. The recently enacted amendments to the Exchange Act, Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 7373 (1995) (codified, inter alia, by adding sections
21D and 21E, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78uD ("Private Securities Litigation") and 78uE ("Applica-
tion of Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements") to Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended), do not alter our analysis. They do not address jurisdictional issues.
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tion of such title or rules and regulations, may be brought in any
such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or
is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases
may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found."
15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
Ill. THE JIDICLAL OAK
The factual issue is who and what are covered by section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. There is no question that an American federal court
has original jurisdiction over a claim by an American purchaser 2 for an
allegedly materially misleading report filed with the SEC.' 3 The difficulty
arises in three areas: (1) when an effect but no conduct occurs in the
U.S.; (2) when conduct but no effect happens in the U.S.; or (3) when
some effect and some conduct occur in the U.S. 1
4
11. Section 1337(a) of the United States Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a), which
confers jurisdiction over "any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Con-
gress regulating commerce," is irrelevant because it "adds nothing" to a federal statute
that has its own jurisdictional provision. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2nd
Cir. 1975).
This article does not address the issue of in personam jurisdiction. It is generally
held that due process concerns are met in a securities case if a defendant has minimum
contacts with the United States as a whole. See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Company, Inc.
v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556, 562 (2nd Cir. 1991) ("Section 27 confers personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who is served anywhere within the United States."), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991). See also Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O'Brien, 11 F.3d
1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994) ("when a federal court is attempting to exercise personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute providing for nationwide
service of process, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has had minimum con-
tacts with the United States"). This is consistent with the subject matter analysis, which
looks to conduct or effect in the United States as a whole.
12. Section 10(b) requires a "purchase or sale" of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975). For ease, we focus on purchases,
which is the more common predicate act. But the analysis applies equally to a claim by a
seller.
13. See Reisch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). Likewise, there is no jurisdiction for a claim by a foreign plaintiff
for misleading reports prepared abroad concerning foreign securities. See Butte Mining
PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Kernan, 468 F.2d 1326 (2nd Cir.
1972), Judge Friendly wrote:
It is true, as Judge L. Hand pointed out in the [U.S. v.] Alu-
minum [Co. of Amer.] case, 148 F. 2d [4161 at 443 [(2d Cir.
1954)], that if Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with
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Courts have developed two tests in considering the alternatives. One
is the "effects" test, i.e. the extent to which the alleged misconduct had
an "effect" in the United States. The second is the "conduct" test,
which analyzes the extent to which the misconduct in question occurred
in the United States.
A. The Effects Test
The effects test is the product of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,5 the
first influential case regarding subject matter jurisdiction of the securities
laws. The facts of Schoenbaum are straightforward: Banff was a Cana-
dian corporation controlled by Aquitaine Corporation, also based in Ca-
nada. Banff shares were traded on both the American Stock Exchange
and the Toronto Stock Exchange. Aquitaine purchased Banff treasury
shares in Canada at then-prevailing Toronto Stock Exchange market
prices at a time when it supposedly knew and withheld information con-
cerning the value of Banff's oil holdings. An American shareholder
brought a derivative action to recover the loss allegedly suffered by
Banff when Aquitaine allegedly purchased Banff's treasury shares at un-
dervalued prices due to Aquitaine's non-disclosure of the value of the oil
holdings.16
respect to conduct outside the United States, even one going
beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a
United States court would be bound to follow the Congres-
sional direction unless this would violate the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, the language of
§10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is much too inconclu-
sive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to impose
rules governing conduct throughout the world in every in-
stance where an American company bought or sold a secur-
ity. When no fraud has been practiced in this country and
the purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be
hard pressed to find justification for going beyond
Schoenban.
Id. at 1334.
15. 405 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1968) (hereinafter Schoenbaum I), rev'd with respect to
holding on merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (hereinafter Schoenbaum II),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
16. The decision by the initial panel to affirm summary judgment for the defendants
on the merits for failing to state a claim under section 10(b) was reversed (except as to
one defendant) by the in banc panel. Schoenbaum II, 405 F.2d 215, 220. The jurisdic-
tional issue was not presented to the in banc panel. The en banc court held that where a
controlling shareholder causes a corporation to issue stock for "a wholly inadequate con-
sideration" a claim under section 10(b) is made out. Id. at 219-20. The Second Circuit's
holding that section 10(b) does not support a state law claim where conduct at issue is
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The district court dismissed the action, holding that the Exchange
Act did not apply to a foreign transaction between foreign buyers and
sellers.' 7 The Second Circuit reversed on the point.' 8 The district court
had jurisdiction:
Congress intended the [Securities] Exchange Act to have extrater-
ritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who
have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of im-
proper foreign transactions in American securities. 9
As a result,
[w]e hold that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction
over violations of the Securities Exchange Act, although the
transactions which are alleged to violate the Act take place
outside the United States, at least when the transactions involve
stock registered on a national securities exchange, and are detri-
mental to the interests of American investors °
The court next broadly interpreted the phrase "detrimental" impact
on American investors. It was enough that the issuer (Banff) received too
little for the stock it sold to Aquitaine. This reduced the equity of Banff
shareholders and therefore the value of shares traded on an American
stock market. "This impairment of the value of American investments by
sales by the issuer in a foreign country, allegedly in violation of the Act,
has in our view, a sufficiently serious effect upon United States com-
merce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for the protection of American
"neither deceptive or manipulative" does not alter this conclusion. See also Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217-18 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See
also Frankel v. Slotkin, 984 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (2nd Cir. 1993).
17. 405 F.2d at 206.
18. The nature of federal appellate practice makes it unlikely that a court of appeals
will consider a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for want of subject matter ju-
risdiction. The final judgment rule requires permission to file an interlocutory appeal. 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Hence only cases dismissed by a district court for lack of jurisdiction will
likely be considered by a court of appeals. Therefore, the fact that a number of major
Second Circuit opinions are reversals of district court's finding that they lack jurisdiction
is not a realistic measure of how, if at all, district judges interpret the scope of their juris-
diction. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2nd Cir. 1991); Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC v. Minorca, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 255 (2nd Cir. 1989).
19. 405 F.2d at 206.
20. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
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investors and consideration of the merits of plaintiff's claim." 21
In any case, under Schoenbaum an American federal court has sub-
ject matter jurisdiction for a section 10(b) claim for foreign conduct that
has a negative effect on American investors. Schoenbaum, however,
proved to be an exception in this area simply because it applied a broad
rule and did not, as we see in later cases, take pains to analyze the par-
ticular facts before it.
B. The Conduct Test
Having addressed the case where a fraud has an effect on securities
bought and sold in the United States, the Second Circuit next addressed
the issue of stock purchases made in the United States due to fraudulent
conduct from securities trading outside the U.S. In Leasco Data Process-
ing Equipment Corp. v. Kernan,22 the purchase was of British stock by an
American corporation on the London Stock Exchange. Although the
stock was not traded in the United States, significant misrepresentations
were made in the U.S., including mail sent and telephone calls made to
the United States.2 Accepting that constitutional jurisdiction is permitted
when only conduct (and not effect) occurs in the United States,24 the is-
sue again was the extent to which the Congress had elected to exercise
that jurisdiction. In Leasco "it was understood from the outset that all
the transactions would be executed in England. Still we must ask our-
selves whether, if Congress had thought about the point, it would not
21. Id. at 208-09. But Judge Friendly, in Bersch, would later refuse to allow too
large a net for what is an "American effect." "Moderation is all," he wrote, and it
would not suffice to have a general effect on the American economy. Section 10(b)'s
remedy is limited to cases where "fraudulent acts ... committed abroad... result in in-
jury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an inter-
est," presumably securities sold in the United States. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519
F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (footnote omitted). As will be
seen below, "those securities" was defined as "either the very securities sold or bought
or other securities of the same issue as in Schoenbaum." Id. at 983 n.34.
22. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.).
23. The negotiations were held over an extended period in New York, as well as in
England. They were in the context of a possible merger transaction in which the defend-
ants, including Robert Maxwell, allegedly made misstatements about the financial condi-
tion and performance of Pergamon. That transaction was never completed because the
plaintiff learned of the falsity during pre-consummation due diligence. The plaintiff had
heard rumors - allegedly instigated by the defendants - of a competing suitor. To
thwart a competing tender, the plaintiff began buying stock of Pergamon on the London
Stock Exchange, ultimately spending some $22,000,000 for it. It was for these purchases
that the plaintiff sued. Id. at 1330-33.
24. Id. at 1334.
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have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the
United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities
abroad, a purpose which its words can fairly be held to embrace." 5
Judge Friendly observed that in the "somewhat different yet closely
related context of choice of law," the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws rejects the application of a "mechanical test," the locus delicti,
to determine what law applies to a tort. The test was no longer where
" 'the last event necessary to make an actor liable,' " as in the first Re-
statement of Conflicts.26 That standard "has given way, in the case of
fraud and misrepresentation, to a more extensive and sophisticated
analysis."27
This, in turn, implies that a sophisticated analysis is necessary in the
particular case, ultimately to determine whether the purpose of the statute
would be furthered by applying it in a somewhat foreign situation. "The
New Yorker who is the object of fraudulent misrepresentations in New
York is as much injured if the securities are in Saskatchewan as in Ne-
vada."' 28 Judge Friendly concluded that "[w]hile, as earlier stated, we
doubt that impact on an American company and its shareholders would
suffice to make the statute applicable if the misconduct had occurred
solely in England, we think it tips the scales in favor of applicability
when substantial misrepresentations were made in the United States."29
Of course, this begs the question: what are "substantial misrepresen-
tations ... made in the United States"? Earlier in the opinion, the court
examined the jurisprudence derived from the "essential link" concept
pronounced by the Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.3° to
determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction would run counter to for-
eign relations law.31 In Leasco, "abundant misrepresentations" were
made in the United States, including meetings in New York and tele-
phone calls and letters to New York that were an "essential link" in in-
ducing the plaintiff to sign (in the United States) the merger documents
which, in turn, were an "essential link" in leading the plaintiff to make
25. Id. at 1337 (emphasis added).
26. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THm CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934)).
27. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 148 (1971)).
28. Id. at 1336.
29. Id. at 1337 (emphasis added).
30. 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
31. 468 F.2d at 1335. While the U.S. may have the authority to "prescribe the con-
duct of its nationals everywhere in the world," Congress has not done so. This is an ex-
ample of the jurisdiction versus competence issue referred to supra at note 6. Leasco
noted that the ultimate, outside assertion of power was determined by due process. Id. at
1334.
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the market purchases. It did not matter where the damages were felt.32
Where an American 33 is injured in the purchase or sale of a security
abroad when an "essential link" to the defendant's fraud occurred in the
United States, an American district court has jurisdiction to apply section
10(b) of the Exchange Act.34
32. Id. at 1335. Judge Friendly analyzed the issue on a pre-trial record and accord-
ing the plaintiff "every favorable inference." 468 F.2d at 1330. He "add[ed] that if a trial
should disclose that the allegedly fraudulent acts of any of the defendants within the
United States were nonexistent or so minimal as not to be material, the principles an-
nounced in this opinion should be applied to the proven facts." Id. In other words, if the
facts that support the assertion of jurisdiction at the pre-trial stage are not borne out at
trial, a judgment dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction would be appropriate.
But a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) does
not require that all inferences be taken in favor of the party opposing the motion (as
would a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion). A district court may resolve factual disputes
that go to its subject matter jurisdiction. As one treatise explains,
[b]y contrast [to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion], subject matter jurisdiction
deals with the power of the court to hear the plaintiff's claims in the first place,
and therefore imposes upon courts an affirmative obligation to ensure that they
are acting within the scope of their jurisdictional power. Accordingly, upon a
challenge to the court's jurisdiction by a party, the court should conduct a care-
ful inquiry and make a conclusive determination whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction or not, or at least defer the inquiry if it is intertwined with the mer-
its of the case.
5A CHAR~s A. WRiGTrr AND ARTmR R. MILER, FEDERAL PPAcncE AND PROCEDURE,
Civit 2D § 1350, at 77 (2d ed. 1995); see also Thornhill Pub. v. General Tel. & Elec.,
594 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1979) (court may consider evidence presented on jurisdictional
issues and render factual findings on Rule 12(b)(1) motion).
33. The court rejected the defendants' argument that there was no subject matter ju-
risdiction because the purchaser of the shares was a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of the
plaintiff (an American corporation). This argument, the court concluded, "elevate(s) form
over substance" given that the subsidiary was "part and parcel of Leasco [the American
company] in every realistic sense." 468 E2d at 1338.
34. The court addressed the issue of what substantive law should be applied to a
claim where the purchase was of foreign securities abroad. Judge Friendly wrote that sec-
tion 17 of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW provides that "the nation where
the conduct has occurred has jurisdiction to displace foreign law and to direct its courts
to apply its own." Id. at 1334. Application of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act where
conduct that is an "essential link" to a fraud in the purchase or sale of a security occurs
in the United States is therefore permitted. Section 17 of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATONS LAw provides that "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) at-
taching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such
consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory." RE-
STATEMENT (SEcOND) oF TmE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17. This
section has been amended slightly in the latest Restatement:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1)(a)
conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interest in things, present within its territory;
19961
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IV. FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS
In Leasco, the Second Circuit began exploring the margins of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction for section 10(b) claims, but it was limited to
claims by Americans. This left open the issue of foreign plaintiffs, which
was addressed in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 35 The stock at issue
was that of 1OS, a Canadian organization with its main office in Switzer-
land. Before 1968 its stock was held only by Bernard Comfeld and asso-
ciates and employees, and there was no organized market for the stock.
The stock was used as a form of compensation, in anticipation of holders
cashing in when IOS went public. Ultimately three simultaneous offer-
ings were made of IOS stock. The largest was of newly-issued stock and
was underwritten by six (including two American) firms, to be sold to
foreigners in Europe, Asia, and Australia. The second offering was a
secondary offering in Canada, with no shares sold to Americans resident
in Canada. The third offering, also a secondary offering, was sold by a
Bahamanian entity to categories of people with relationships with lOS;
its prospectus provided that the shares "are not being offered in the
United States of America or any of its territories or possessions or any
area subject to its jurisdiction."7 The shares ultimately became worth-
less, and the plaintiff (an American who bought into the offering despite
the restrictions on such sales) alleged a claim under section 10(b), among
others for alleged false and misleading statements in the prospectuses.3 1
Numerous actions actually took place in New York concerning the
offerings: a number of meetings were held in connection with the offer-
ings, an American accounting firm was retained to review IOS's opera-
tions, the accountant met with the underwriters to discuss the scope of its
services, preliminary discussions about discounts and commissions on the
offerings were held, parts of the prospectuses were drafted, and the pro-
ceeds of the sales were deposited in an account in New York. In addi-
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is di-
rected against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402.
35. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
36. The prospectuses were to be delivered in those countries. Id. at 980.
37. 519 F.2d at 978-80 (quoting prospectus).
38. Id. at 980-81. The prospectuses for the three offerings were essentially the same
insofar as alleged misstatements are concerned.
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tion, a New York law firm represented the underwriters and met with
IOS. The meetings were held between the underwriters, their counsel,
and the SEC.39 The issue before the court was whether Congress permit-
ted these exercises 0 These activities, the Second Circuit held, were suffi-
cient to permit the assertion of jurisdiction under principles of foreign re-
lations law without regard to where the effects were felt.
4
'
Assuming the three activities could be treated as a single underwrit-
ing, Judge Friendly concluded that because the U.S. activities were
merely preparatory to the offerings (assuming the three could be treated
as a single underwriting) and "relatively small in comparison to those
[actions that occurred] abroad," jurisdiction over the claim of a foreign
plaintiff was inappropriate. 42 Nor was it enough that there would be some
impact in the United States as a result of the collapse of IOS.43
The limitation was of section 10O(b)'s remedy to cases where "fraud-
ulent acts ...committed abroad ...results in injury to purchasers or
sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an interest fur-
ther distinguished the treatment of foreign plaintiffs from American
ones." 4" While a foreign citizen's claim would not be heard, that of an
American citizen, even residing abroad, would be heard where any con-
duct, however preparatory, was committed in the United States.45 Thus,
Judge Friendly provided the following outline to explain the provisions
of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident
in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to
act) of material importance occurred in the country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident
abroad if, but only if, acts or culpable failures to act of material
importance in the United States have significantly contributed
thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
39. Id. at 985 n.24. The defendants disputed the weight to be given to these U.S. ac-
tivities. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 985.
42. Id. at 986-87.
43. Id. at 988.
44. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d at 989 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 992. Bersch was a class action. Id. at 993. As a result of its holding on
jurisdiction and the distinct treatment for foreign as opposed to American plaintiffs, the
Second Circuit ordered that the class not include those who were neither citizens nor re-
sidents of the United States. Id. at 995-97.
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within the United States directly caused such losses.4
What, however, is the difference between conduct that "significantly
contributed" to losses and conduct that "directly caused" losses? The
Second Circuit attempted to answer this question in iT v. Vencap, Ltd.,47
decided on the same day as Bersch, which reference each other. IT in-
volved an extremely complicated fact pattern that we need not relate
here, but two main contributions are worthy of being set forth in
summary.
First, because the Second Circuit does "not think Congress intended
to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudu-
lent security devices for export, even when these are peddled to foreign-
ers," where "fraudulent acts themselves" and not merely preparatory ac-
tivities or inaction with the bulk of the fraudulent acts took place abroad,
a federal district court has jurisdiction over section 10(b) actions. 8
Second, an American citizen does not travel the globe with obliga-
tions of the federal securities laws in his baggage; an American who
commits a fraud entirely in, say, England (i.e. with English misstate-
ments, English securities, and English victims) is not subject to a claim
under section 10(b).49
Bersch involved only preparatory work in the United States and al-
lowed subject matter jurisdiction over Americans only. lIT, however, re-
manded to the district court for findings on its facts and said that the
mere exchange of a draft agreement by American lawyers for an agree-
ment negotiated elsewhere was not enough to confer subject matter juris-
diction over the transaction. On remand, the issue of whether the use of
funds to maintain a New York office in which hundreds of transactions
and pieces of mail were generated and transactional records kept sufficed
to constitute acts that "consummated the fraud," was decided. The court
ultimately exercised jurisdiction over the claims of foreigners.5°
The line, then, for foreign plaintiffs was drawn: subject matter juris-
diction for a foreign plaintiff's claim exists if the U.S. conduct "directly
caused" plaintiffs' losses. It was left to later decisions to define that line.
Psimenos v. E.F Hutton & Co. 5 1 was a case under the Commodities
Exchange Act 52 (the scope of subject matter jurisdiction for which is
46. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
47. 519 F.2d 1001 (2nd Cir. 1978).
48. Id. at 1017-18.
49. Id. at 1016-17.
50. Id. at 1018.
51. 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983).
52. 7 U.S.C. § 1-24.
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analogous to that existing under the Securities Exchange Act 53) alleging
that a foreigner's brokerage account at E.F. Hutton's Athens office was
handled contrary to representations in company brochures. 54 "Although
most of the fraudulent misrepresentations alleged in the complaint oc-
curred outside the United States, the trading contracts that consummated
the transactions were often executed in New York."' 55 Applying the con-
duct test, the Second Circuit focused "on the nature of conduct within
the United States as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent
scheme."' 56 The fact that the allegedly misleading pamphlet emanated
from New York would not support jurisdiction; however, the additional
fact that the alleged fraud was completed by trades on American ex-
changes did support jurisdiction.57 Thus, although the trades themselves
were proper, they were of American commodities and could only be con-
summated on an American exchange. Consistent with Congress's desire
that American commodities markets not be used "as a base to consum-
mate schemes concocted abroad, particularly when the perpetrators are
agents of American corporations," jurisdiction to hear the claims existed
in a federal court.58 This result was consistent, the court wrote, with
Leasco.59
Relying on Psimenos, the Second Circuit also found jurisdiction in
Alfadda v. Fenn,60 which involved allegations that representations in a
prospectus concerning, essentially, preemptory rights and non-dilution of
share interests, were false in that the defendant company later sold stock
to a third party. Jurisdiction existed because the transaction - a sale of
stock - that allegedly caused the injury was largely negotiated and con-
summated in the U.S. 61 In this case, the Second Circuit reversed the
lower court, which had held that because the fraud was consummated
53. See Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1044 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 1043-44.
55. Id. at 1044.
56. Id. at 1045.
57. Id. at 1046.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1046-47. The Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
because the American trades were themselves not fraudulent they did not support jurisdic-
tion. The test, the appellate court wrote, was not whether the American activity was
fraudulent but whether the American activity " 'directly caused' the loss." Id. at 1046
(quoting Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993).
60. 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1005 (1991).
61. Id. at 179. The court of appeals noted that although the buyer of the stock was a
foreign company, it was merely a shell for an American company, formed for the pur-
pose of holding the stock. This did "not detract from the import of the United States
meetings and negotiations which preceded the sai." Id.
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when the plaintiffs bought stock pursuant to the false prospectus, that
predated the sales complained of and "nothing further had to be done to
complete the fraud." The court also found later acts committed in the
U.S. were irrelevant. 62 The Second Circuit expressly rejected this
conclusion.P
V. THE ITOBA DECISION
The Second Circuit analyzed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
by applying the conduct or effects test separately. Was there sufficient
conduct? Was there a sufficient effect? But even in Bersch, where levels
of conduct were a factor - a higher level required for the foreign plain-
tiff - seemingly simple rules were announced. It was inevitable, then,
that the court would face a case where while neither of the tests was sat-
isfied alone and enough of both appeared to give pause. Judge Friendly
had suggested that it would be wrong to be simplistic in this area, warn-
ing in Leasco that in this as in other areas of the law "mechanical tests"
do not suffice for analyzing foreign transactions.
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC64 would provide the Second Circuit
with a vehicle for analyzing and acknowledging a mixed fact situation.
The corporate defendant, Lep Group PLC, was a London-based holding
company with subsidiaries in thirty countries. 65 Lep's ordinary shares
were registered in the United Kingdom and traded on the London Stock
Exchange. 66 Nine and one quarter percent of these ordinary shares (the
equivalent of common stock shares for American companies) were de-
posited in an American depository, which issued one American Deposi-
tory Receipt (ADR) for each five ordinary shares deposited with it.67 The
ADRs, in turn, traded as American Depository Shares (ADSs) on the
Nasdaq, subjected Lep to the reporting requirements of the U.S. securi-
62. Alfaada v. Fenn, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,652,
at 98,040 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1990) (relying on Betsch), rev'd, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1005 (1991).
63. 935 F.2d at 479.
64. 54 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 702 (1996).
65. Id. The Second Circuit's opinion does not state whether one of those countries
was the United States.
66. Id.
67. Id. "ADR's are, in substance, 'receipts' issued by a domestic bank for shares of
foreign corporations that have been deposited in an overseas bank. The 'receipts' can
then be traded in the United States without any of the complications that ordinarily arise
because of currency conversions and customs requirements." In re Nomura Secs. Int'l.,
Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 81 N.Y.2d 614, 616, 619 N.E.2d 385, 386, 601 N.Y.S.2d 448, 448
(N.Y. 1993).
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ties laws.6
The plaintiff, Itoba, was a Channel Islands company whose parent
was A.D.T. Limited ("ADT"), a Bermuda company. ADT's shares traded
on the New York Stock Exchange, and approximately half of its share-
holders of record resided in the United States. 69 ADT was also the parent
of A.D.T. Securities Systems, Inc.,("A.D.T. Securities") a Delaware cor-
poration engaged in the security services industry.
70
One of the largest competitors of A.D.T. Securities was National
Guardian, which was a subsidiary of Lep. ADT owned shares in Lep and
thus had an indirect interest in National Guardian. 71 It also considered ac-
quiring National Guardian as a way to expand its subsidiary, A.D.T. Se-
curities. After a possible joint venture to acquire Lep was abandoned,
ADT began to purchase Lep ordinary shares (and therefore National
Guardian) on the London Stock Exchange.72 ADT relied on ADT's chief
financial officer's review of an Lep SEC filing and a report prepared by
the financial adviser to the potential joint venturer in making its decision
to purchase the stock. 3 The company used Itoba to make its actual stock
purchases. While this creeping acquisition was in progress, Lep's stock
price collapsed, and the value of Itoba's (and ADT's) $114 million in-
vestment in Lep dropped by nearly $111 million.74 Itoba asserted a claim
against Lep and Lep's insiders under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.75
68. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 120. Although the opinion does not announce it, the stock was
traded on the Nasdaq National Market System, which can be a significant fact for an effi-
cient market analysis.
69. Id. The court does not specify what percentage of outstanding shares was held
by U.S. residents.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 121.
73. Id. The particular filing was an annual report on Form 20-F, which is the for-
eign issuer's equivalent of a Form 10-K.
74. Id.
75. Id. According to the Second Circuit, claims were also asserted under section
12(2) of the Exchange Act. Id. This is probably a typo which should read "20(a)" (15
U.S.C. § 78t(a)), which imposes vicarious liability on "control persons" of violators of
the Exchange Act. There is no section 12(2) of the Exchange Act.
The case also has an interesting discussion of liability for selling in an exchange
transaction when in possession of material inside information even when the sale is on a
foreign exchange. Itoba bought 7.5 million ordinary shares on the London Stock Ex-
change on the same day that an insider (Berkeley) sold 7.3 million ordinary shares on
that Exchange, and most of the shares bought were later found to have been those sold
by Berkeley. Although the Second Circuit declined to rule on whether a claim was stated
on these facts-it remanded because the district court had dismissed the claim without
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In summation, the key facts, then, are that (i) a foreign company
(ADT, through an off-shore subsidiary) was (ii) defrauded in purchasing
(iii) another foreign company's stock (Lep) (iv) on the London Exchange
(v) in part in reliance on the latter's required SEC filings. Although a
foreign company, the buyer's stock was traded on the New York Stock
Exchange and half of its shareholders of record were residents of the
U.S. But the loss complained of was felt in the loss in the value of the
stock bought in London.
The question before the Second Circuit was whether either of the
two tests be satisfied based on these facts. Although a large number of
ADT's shareholders were American and although its stock traded on the
New York Stock Exchange, Itoba, the victim, was a foreign company.76
Under Schoenbaum, there was an insufficient effect in the United States
to justify the assertion of jurisdiction.
The closer question was whether the defendant's conduct enough. In
other words, was the loss in London "directly caused" by the filing of
the false report with the SEC? The purchase of the stock ("transaction
causation" T) was caused by the false report.78 But was the loss caused
by the false report?79 The Second Circuit held that it was because of the
nature of ADRs.
The ADRs were simply a grouping into one security of five ordi-
nary shares. Inevitably, there was a direct linkage between the
prices of the ADRs representing five ordinary shares and the
prices of the single ordinary shares themselves. If the ordinary
share price fell on the London Exchange, the market price of an
ADR would decrease in similar manner, and vice versa.
discussion-it wrote that "it would seem" to be a violation of the "disclose or abstain"
rule; "Because antifraud provisions are designed to prevent corporate insiders from taking
unfair advantage of uninformed outsiders, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228, 235
(2d Cir. 1974) (citing Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1972)), [the defendant] Berkeley alleged nondisclosure during a sales transaction executed
by two parties within the United States - Berkeley and his broker - is the type of con-
duct that should trigger jurisdiction." 54 F.3d at 125.
76. Ignoring that its subsidiary actually bought the stock.
77. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
78. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121. This was the case although Itoba's board did not read the
report because Itoba was merely the tool of ADT, which did read the report. Such deriva-
tive reliance was adequate. Id. at 122 (citing, inter alia, Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d
168, 177-78 & n.19 (8th Cir. 1982), appeal after remand, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986)).
79. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d at 381.
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54 F.3d at 123.
The court would not say that the conduct involved was enough to
confer subject matter jurisdiction. Instead it melded the conduct and ef-
fects tests. "There is no requirement that these two tests be applied sepa-
rately and distinctly from each other. Indeed, an admixture or combina-
tion of the two often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient
United States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an
American court."' 0 Using this formulation, the court found there was
subject matter jurisdiction because "Lep's uncorrected nondisclosure [in
SEC filings] played as much a role in Itoba's purchase as the price list-
ings on the London Exchange and NASDAQ. In view of the deleterious
effect this continued nondisclosure had on the thousands of ADT share-
holders in the United States, it cannot be described correctly as incidental
or preparatory [to the fraud]."'"
VI. THE EFFECr OF ITOBA ON PURCHASERS ON FOREIGN EXCHANGES
The impact of the flexible approach dictated by Itoba can be seen in
contrasting it to an earlier case, The Nathan Gordon Trust v. Northgate
Exploration Ltd.,82 which Itoba sought to distinguish, unsuccessfully from
this article's viewpoint. Northgate involved a Canadian company whose
common stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange as well as
the Toronto, London, and Montreal Exchanges. The class action com-
plaint alleged that the price of the company's stock was inflated by mis-
leading statements made in materials filed with the SEC concerning the
development of a gold mine in Canada. The jurisdictional issue arose on
the plaintiff's motion for class certification, in which it sought to repre-
sent all purchasers who bought Northgate common stock on any ex-
change, domestic or foreign, during the proposed class period. The de-
fendants objected to the inclusion of a class of purchasers other than
those on the New York Stock Exchange. The defendants' objection was
based on the ground that the court could not assert jurisdiction over their
claims, and the district court agreed. 3
The plaintiff in Northgate argued that, since a change in price on a
domestic exchange would be reflected in a similar change on a foreign
exchange, the filing of materially misleading reports with the SEC estab-
lished conduct enough for subject matter jurisdiction over all purchasers'
80. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
82. 148 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Griesa, CJ.). Both of the authors represented
the plaintiff in Northgate.
83. Id. at 108.
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claims. 84 The court rejected such a rule, holding that "the relevant 'con-
duct' in the present case occurred in Canada where the alleged mislead-
ing information was authored. The mere filing of reports with the SEC
and the dissemination of some materials to shareholders in the United
States were merely incidental to the authorship, preparation and dissemi-
nation of the allegedly false information, all of which occurred in Ca-
nada."85 Thus the conduct test was failed, and those for whom no effect
was felt in the U.S. - i.e. all those who did not purchase on the NYSE
could not assert claims in the district court.86 Insofar as Northgate
84. This precise view was accepted in an unreported decision, Holtz v. National
Business Systems, Civ. No. 88-1755 (D.N.J. May 22, 1989). The court accepted the
plaintiff's argument on a class certification motion that a unitary market existed for the
stock at issue in Canada and the United States. In another case, the subject matter juris-
diction issue was not raised, but the court seemed to assume it subject matter jurisdiction
over the foreign purchases. See In re Laidlaw Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 68341 (E.D. Pa.
March 31, 1992). However, the Court refused to certify a class which included purchasers
on the Toronto and Montreal exchanges, on the grounds that the plaintiff would have no
interest in proving the efficiency of these markets since he purchased on the NYSE. Id. at
*14.
85. It is difficult to reconcile this holding with Itoba, which held that the filing of
reports with the SEC was relevant conduct, at least in part. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 124. Moreo-
ver, the SEC reports at issue in Itoba were authored in England. Id.
86. In theory, the court should have allowed the claim of Americans that bought
Northgate stock on foreign exchanges during the class period because this would seem to
fall within the second prong of the Bersch test. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text. In a class context, however, such a finding would have created significant complica-
tions in the notice process. Ultimately, notice was sent to those who the Company could
identify as having bought on the NYSE. Including foreign purchasing Americans would
have greatly enhanced the class notice obligation in that efforts would have to be made to
contact all purchasers in Toronto, London, and Montreal would have been contacted on
the chance that some were Americans.
Itoba sought to distinguish Northgate as being a motion on class certification, but
that distinction does not stand. It wrote:
Northgate involved a motion for class certification. The defendant was a Cana-
dian corporation which owned an interest in a gold mine located in northern
Canada, concerning which the defendant filed allegedly false SEC statements.
The proposed class was to consist of all persons who purchased Northgate stock
on the Toronto, Montreal, London and New York Exchanges. The defendant re-
quested that the class be limited to those who purchased on the New York Ex-
change, and the district court granted its request. In contrast to the discretionary
nature of the district court's class certification ruling and the "fraud on the mar-
ket" class issues of Northgate, the instant case involves a single plaintiff assert-
ing direct individual fraud.
54 F.3d at 123. Bersch, after all, was also a class action and the Second Circuit did not
find that that element of the case altered its analysis, pursuant to which it decided that
certain stock purchasers could not be members of a class because the district court lacked
jurisdiction over their claims.
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pronounced a situs-of-preparation rule, it was rejected by Itoba:
[W]e hold that the situs of preparations for SEC filings should
not be determinative of jurisdictional questions. Otherwise, the
protection afforded by the Securities Exchange Act could be cir-
cumvented simply by preparing SEC filings outside the United
States. We find no support in the Act for such a result.
54 F.3d at 124.
Finding that the mere filing of a misleading SEC report prepared
abroad was not conduct enough to sustain jurisdiction for foreign pur-
chasers meant that the Northgate court would not assert jurisdiction over
the claims of such buyers. This pre-Itoba approach did not allow the
court to weigh other factors that might compel a different result, and it is
allowing for this possibility that makes Itoba significant.
Northgate did not address the argument that the filing of misleading
SEC reports and the corresponding effect this would have (on an efficient
exchange) on the price of domestic securities actually injured purchasers
on non-American exchanges. Itoba, however, found that "[ilnevitably,
there was a direct linkage between the prices of the ADRs representing
five ordinary shares and the prices of the single ordinary shares them-
selves. If the ordinary share price fell on the London Exchange, the mar-
ket price of an ADR would decrease in similar manner, and vice
versa."'87 Thus, if the price of an ADR falls or rises in the United States,
it will also fall or rise abroad. Also, conduct in the United States that in-
flated the price on a domestic stock exchange would directly cause injury
to purchasers abroad.
Still, Itoba refused to allow the facts surrounding the SEC filing at
issue and especially the injury that directly flowed from it to be com-
pletely dispositive of the subject matter jurisdiction.88 It would not hold
that such U.S. conduct above was enough to justify the assertion of juris-
diction notwithstanding that the inflation in the price of ADRs (in the
United States) inflated the price of ordinary shares on the London -Ex-
87. 54 F.3d at 123 (emphasis added). The "direct linkage" exposes a flaw in In re
Laidlaw Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 68341 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1992), in which only purchases
on the NYSE were included in a certified class and purchases on the Toronto and Mon-
treal Exchanges were excluded. The Laidlaw court reasoned that the class representative,
a purchaser on the NYSE, would have "no interest in demonstrating how the alleged
fraud may have affected prices on the Montreal or Toronto Exchanges." Id. at *6. With a
"direct linkage" between domestic and foreign exchange prices, a domestic purchaser
would necessarily prove inflation on the foreign exchange when he proved inflation on
the domestic exchange on his direct case.
88. Id. at 124.
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change. Instead, Itoba considered who was injured by this U.S. conduct,
i.e. the effect: "In view of the deleterious effect this continued nondisclo-
sure had on the thousands of ADT shareholders in the United States, it
cannot be described correctly as incidental or preparatory."8 9 While the
effect felt in the United States certainly buttresses the finding of subject
matter jurisdiction, it would seem that the conduct alone described in
Itoba should be sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, regardless
of any application of the effects test. It remains to be seen whether any
courts will so hold.
VII. SUBJECT MArER JURISDICTIoN AFTER ITOBA
Itoba, in a sense, hearkened back to a theme in Bersch that has been
somewhat ignored. The Bersch three-prong scenario in essence an-
nounced different conduct tests based on the effect felt in the United
States: (1) no conduct is necessary for a U.S. resident; (2) some conduct
is necessary for a U.S. citizen residing abroad; and (3) much conduct is
necessary for foreigners. 90 Thus the "admixture" of the tests in Itoba
should come as no surprise. Itoba did blur the strict three-prong Bersch
test so that the categories no longer fit as neatly. It is more appropriate to
think of the subject matter jurisdiction test as a graph.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
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Subject matter jurisdiction would lie in cases outside the shaded
area.91 While the conduct axis is very case-specific, one thing that makes
the graph manageable is the limited nature of the effect axis. The plain-
tiff is either a citizen, a citizen residing abroad, a foreigner, or a foreign
corporation with significant U.S. shareholders.92 The question is where
the foreign corporation falls on the axis. We suggest it belongs between
the foreigner and the U.S. citizen residing abroad.
VIII. CONCLUSION.
Itoba will not affect a finding of subject matter jurisdiction in a case
that satisfies either the conduct or the effects test.93 What Itoba does is
reinvigorate what was perhaps implicit in Bersch: that the reach of the
91. The only case so far to apply the admixture test is Europe and Overseas Com-
modity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 940 F. Supp 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The
Banque Paribas court found no effect at all and very little conduct, placing it in the
lower left quadrant of the graph. Id. at 535.
92. There is seemingly no reason to distinguish between foreign corporations whose
stock or ADRs are traded on American exchanges and foreign corporations whose stock
or ADRs are not traded on American exchanges. Under Itoba, the relevant inquiry seems
to be the level of U.S. stock ownership, regardless of where the stock trades.
93. See, e.g., Carr v. Equistar Offshore, Ltd., 1995 WL 562178, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 1995) (finding subject matter jurisdiction using only conduct test).
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federal securities laws is not an either/or proposition but a more flexible
one in which cases where the facts do not support one or the other of the
tests support a finding of subject matter jurisdiction where the elements
of conduct and effects together, as an "admixture," make it reasonable to
conclude that Congress intended to have federal securities laws apply.
